VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question

192. To the first argument of the second question, when the argument through Hugh of St. Victor and Cassiodorus is made [nn.133-134], the response is that they are speaking here, not of the formal object, but of the proximate matter which is more extensively dealt with in Scripture, because of the more immediate order to the end they are holding to.

193. To the second [n.135] I say that metaphysics is not about God as about its first subject. The proof is that, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science in which are proved all the things that are common to the special ones; therefore, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science about being, in which the knowledge of the properties of being are dealt with, which knowledge is presupposed in the special sciences; if then there is some science about God there is, in addition to it, some naturally known science about being insofar as it is being.

But when it is proved through the Philosopher in the Metaphysics [n.135] that the science of metaphysics is about God, I say that his argument thus concludes: ‘the noblest science is about the noblest class of things’, whether as first subject or as considered in that science in the most perfect way in which, in any naturally acquired science, it can be considered.Interpolation: “because the properties of being that are convertible with being are known supremely about any being, then knowledge of the more nobly distinct properties of a being, which knowledge divides them to the same supreme belonging, is the most noble that can naturally be had of God; but all this knowledge is metaphysics, because that which has the job of considering a property in general about a subject in general has the job of knowing the same property supremely about the same subject in particular.” ⁶²

194. To the Commentator on the Physics [n.136] I say that Avicenna - whom the Commentator contradicts - spoke well and the Commentator badly. The proof is: first, that if the existence of any separate substances were a presupposition in the science of metaphysics and a conclusion in natural science, then physics would be simply prior to the whole of metaphysics, because physics would show the ‘whether it exists’ about the subject of metaphysics, which fact is presupposed to the whole knowledge of the science of metaphysics. - Second, that a proof can be given about the existence of a cause through any condition of the effect that could not exist in the effect unless the cause existed; but many properties are considered in metaphysics that can only be present in beings from some first cause of such beings; therefore, on the basis of such properties, metaphysics can demonstrate that there is some first cause of those beings. The proof of the minor is that the multitude of beings, their dependence, composition, and the like -which are the properties of metaphysics - show that there is something that is simple in its actuality, altogether independent, and necessarily existent. Also, the existence of a first cause is much more perfectly shown from the properties of caused things considered in metaphysics than from the natural properties by which is shown that there is a first mover; also it is a more perfect and more immediate knowledge of the first being to know it as first being, or as necessarily existent, than to know it as first mover.

195. To the other citation [n.137] I say that relation to an end is not the noblest idea of knowledge but that which the end is - as being the idea of the foundation of that relation - is the noblest idea; but the deity is the founding idea of the relation of end for creatures; therefore the deity will be the first object, which I concede. And thus proceeds the argument to the opposite.

But when the proof from the Metaphysics about the good is given [n.137], I say that if the good, by a certain appropriateness, is foundation of the end, still the deity is the root and first foundation of it. But the consequence is good: ‘if there is no final end, then there is no good’, because if there is no perfect good there is no good; but no good is perfect which is ordered to some further good, because a good of this sort has a diminished goodness. However it is not necessary that goodness be the proper idea of end itself, but essence is more proper and fundamental. Hereby is it clear, in respect of the remark of Avicenna on the Metaphysics [n.137], that the remark must be understood, not of the end, but of the fundamental idea in respect of the end.